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Empathy refers to the thoughts and feelings of one individual in response to the
observed (emotional) experiences of another individual. Empathy, however, can occur
toward persons experiencing a variety of emotions, raising the question of whether or not
empathy can be emotion specific. This paper discusses theoretical and empirical support
for the emotion specificity of empathy. We present a new measure, the Emotion Specific
Empathy questionnaire, which assesses affective and cognitive empathy for the six basic
emotions. This paper presents the measure’s psychometric qualities and demonstrates,
through a series of models, the discriminant validity between emotion specific empathies
suggesting empathy is emotion specific. Results and implications are discussed.
Keywords: affective empathy, cognitive empathy, emotion, psychometric analysis, measurement model
INTRODUCTION
To effectively navigate the social world, it is important to under-
stand others, infer their thoughts and feelings, and to affectively
connect to their emotional experiences. Put differently, the extent
to which one can empathize with others is a key component
of a successful social interaction. Literature on empathy sup-
ports its strong role in effective social functioning: Empathy is
related to various prosocial behaviors such as helping (e.g., Batson
et al., 1989, 1991, 1997) and cooperation (e.g., Eisenberg and
Miller, 1987). Patients interacting with empathic doctors recover
more quickly (e.g., Van Dulmen and Bensing, 2002) and empa-
thy improves intergroup relations (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2010).
Empathy, however, can occur toward persons experiencing a vari-
ety of emotions, raising the question of whether or not empathy
can be emotion specific.
This paper discusses theoretical and empirical support for the
possible emotion specificity of empathy. In lieu of that research,
we find that present measures of empathy are biased in that they
do not take an emotion differentiated perspective on empathy.
We present a possible solution to this problem by introducing
a new measure, the Emotion Specific Empathy questionnaire,
which was designed to assess emotion specific affective and cog-
nitive empathy. We will present that measure, its psychometric
qualities, and tests that suggest there may be emotion specific
empathic reactions.
EMPATHY
At large, empathy refers to the thoughts and feelings of one indi-
vidual in response to the observed (emotional) experiences of
another individual (e.g., Davis, 1983; cf. Woltin et al., 2011).
However, similar to most psychological constructs, the specific
definition of empathy is debatable. Batson (2009) identifies eight
definitions of empathy that are currently in use; of these eight,
we will expand on two that are commonly applied. The first
definition refers to knowing the internal state of another person
and has been referred to as cognitive empathy, perspective tak-
ing, empathic accuracy, and theory of mind (Batson’s Concept 1).
This type of empathy, referred to in this paper as Cognitive
Empathy, is related to better negotiation outcomes and satis-
faction with the negotiation process (e.g., Bazerman and Neale,
1982; Galinsky et al., 2008), reduced stereotypes (e.g., Todd et al.,
2011), and enhanced intergroup contact (e.g., Falk and Johnson,
1977). The second definition proposed by Batson (2009) refers
to feeling the “same emotion that another person feels” (page 5)
and has been referred to as emotional contagion, affective empa-
thy, and emotional empathy (Batson’s Concept 3). This type of
empathy, referred to in this paper as Affective Empathy, refers to
an affective connection with another person’s emotional state,
and closely relates to an other-oriented reaction regarding the
perceived welfare of the other person (cf. Batson et al., 1997).
Affective empathy is related to behavioral mimicry (Dimberg
et al., 2011) and the motor neuron system facilitating behavioral
mimicry (Nummenmaa et al., 2008).
Although both types of empathy imply the processing of oth-
ers’ emotional states, emotion-specificity in both the concept as
well as the assessment of cognitive and affective empathy has not
yet been considered. In the following we will elaborate on why
considering emotion specificity in empathy is worthwhile as it
presents an advancement in the theorizing and measurement of
the concept of empathy.
EMOTION SPECIFIC EMPATHY
In the following section, we present several arguments that sug-
gest researchers may need to consider empathy from an emotion
specific perspective. First, we refer to a prominent theoreti-
cal model of empathy, the Perception-Action Model (PAM) of
empathy (cf. Preston and de Waal, 2002; Preston and Stansfield,
2008; Preston and Hofelich, 2012), which (implicitly) assumes
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emotion specific empathy. PAM assumes that for an empathic
reaction to occur, the observer (i.e., the subject) must attend to
another individual’s (i.e., the object’s) emotional state. By attend-
ing to the object’s state, the subject’s neural representations of
similar states are automatically activated, thus, other-oriented
object-congruent reactions are facilitated. Herein, PAM provides
a theoretical framework that relates empathy to concepts such
as facial mimicry (e.g., Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003), emo-
tional contagion (e.g., Blairy et al., 1999), and recognizing emo-
tions in the face (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2011). PAM suggests that
highly empathic individuals are those who are more success-
ful and/or more motivated to attend to others’ emotional states
and thereby often have similar neural representations consequen-
tially activated. This explains why those who are highly empathic
show facial mimicry at an earlier stage of information processing
(Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003), are better at detecting others’
emotions (Dimberg et al., 2011), and display more emotional
contagion (Blairy et al., 1999).
Importantly, the entire process outlined in PAM implies emo-
tion specificity given that the type of emotional state observed in
the object by the subject should elicit different neural representa-
tions, setting the stage for different empathic responses and con-
sequently leading to different facial mimicry reactions, emotional
contagion, and behavioral reactions. Whereas most research has
identified the same areas may be implicated for several emotions
(cf. Cunningham et al., 2008; Kober et al., 2008; Shackman et al.,
2011; Lindquist et al., 2012; Oosterwijk et al., 2012) some find-
ings indicate that feeling different emotions are associated with
activity in different brain regions (e.g., Lane et al., 1997; Pelletier
et al., 2003; Tettamanti et al., 2012). However, the potential dif-
ferentiation in brain region and neural networks, even at the level
of positive and negative affect, suggests this differentiation might
carry through to the level of specific emotions.
Nevertheless, the extent to which one can empathize with
another individual may vary depending on the empathized emo-
tion as the PAM suggests. Correspondingly, in other avenues,
research suggests emotion specificity may exist in empathy related
abilities, such as mimicry, emotion memory, and emotion recog-
nition (e.g., Oberman et al., 2007; Ponari et al., 2012; Wilhelm
et al., in press). An emotion specific conceptualization and mea-
surement of empathy will instigate future research that disentan-
gles the relation between, for example, empathizing with some-
one’s sadness and mimicking his/her sadness, happiness, or fear.
An emotion specific perspective on empathy appears more appro-
priate to us, not only because—as elaborated above—empathic
reactions to sadness should imply different processes compared to
empathic reactions to joy, anger, or disgust (cf. Lane et al., 1997;
Preston and de Waal, 2002; Pelletier et al., 2003; Tettamanti et al.,
2012), but also because being able to empathize with another’s
sadness (in contrast to another emotion such as anger) should
be related to different behavioral outcomes and help us further
understand individual differences in empathy.
Finally, on a behavioral level, we argue individuals will pro-
duce behavioral reactions that differ depending on the emotion
of interest. For example, perceiving sadness in others increases
affiliative tendencies and helping behavior while this is not the
case for perceiving anger (Hendriks and Vingerhoets, 2006; Van
Doorn et al., 2012). While affectively connecting (i.e., showing
affective empathy) with a sad person increases one’s willingness to
help that person (see Batson et al., 1989, 1991, 1997), it is debat-
able whether affectively connecting with an angry person results
in the same increased willingness to help. This is because anger
and sadness differ in their underlying appraisals (cf. Frijda, 1986),
which in turn affects behavioral consequences of these emotions
(cf. Horstmann, 2003; Seidel et al., 2010). Anger, for example, is
an emotion that arises when a sudden obstacle appears in the pur-
suit of one’s goals, leading the subject to perceive unfairness and
wish to fight the obstacle (Haidt, 2003). Consequentially, anger is
associated with approach-related, aggressive behavioral tenden-
cies (e.g., Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Hence, it appears
plausible that an individual who is sensitive to others’ anger (i.e., a
highly anger-empathic individual) might be more likely to engage
in aggressive behavioral acts than if he or she was highly sadness-
or fear-empathic.
Taken together, we argue that at least three main arguments
speak to the fact that a differentiated perspective on empathy is
well indicated. First, theoretical models of empathy suggest emo-
tion specificity (cf. Preston and de Waal, 2002). Second, consid-
ering empathy as emotion specific yields new research questions
and potentially important insights on the relation of empathy and
related concepts and abilities such as mimicry, emotion recog-
nition, and emotion memory, because different emotions are
associated with different appraisals and information processing
(cf. Frijda, 1986). Finally, given specific appraisals are associ-
ated with different emotions, different consequences might be
associated with empathy when considered emotion specific.
EMOTION SPECIFIC EMPATHY QUESTIONNAIRE
Building on the rationale elaborated above, we decided to test
whether or not individuals report differing levels of empathy
depending on the type of emotion addressed. It is notable that
established questionnaires assessing empathy, both on a cognitive
as well as on an affective dimension, are geared mainly toward
assessing reactions to the sadness causing misfortunes experi-
enced by others. For example, the Empathic Concern subscale of
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), generally con-
sidered to assess affective empathy, contains items such as “I often
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate thanme.”
or “When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind
of protective toward them.” Likewise, Mehrabian and Epstein’s
(1972) measure of emotional empathy contains items such as “I
cannot continue to feel OK if people aroundme are depressed.” or
“Seeing people cry upsets me.” We argue that these items reflect
the extent to which one can empathize with somebody in terms
of compassion or pity.
Since current measures of empathy are lacking the considera-
tion of emotion specificity in empathic reactions, we developed
a new emotion specific measure of empathy called the Emotion
Specific Empathy questionnaire. As a first approach to the topic,
we decided to include, of all possible and plausible emotional
reactions to others’ emotional experiences, the six basic emo-
tions (cf. Frijda, 1986; Ekman, 1992). There is some support for
the existence of these emotion categories, in particular regard-
ing the perception of facial emotion expressions (e.g., Elfenbein
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and Ambady, 2002), however the discreetness of these emotions is
controversial with others proposing alternative structures to emo-
tion (e.g., see the series of articles between Barrett, Panksepp, and
Izard: Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; Izard, 2007a,b; Panksepp,
2007). The development of the ESE with its base in the six basic
emotions was meant as an initial approach to examine poten-
tial emotion or affect specific bias in empathy and is not meant
to identify the only ways empathy might be emotion specific or
exclude other ways empathymight be emotion specific. To do this,
we designed a questionnaire that assesses individuals’ capability
to connect cognitively and affectively with others experiencing
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, or surprise. We developed
12 subscales to assess specific affective or cognitive empathy for
each of the six basic emotions. For example, the Anger Affective
Empathy subscale assesses the extent to which one affectively
connects with and feels another person’s anger and the Anger
Cognitive Empathy subscale assesses the extent to which one can
cognitively take another person’s perspective and understand why
that person is angry.
We wrote 10 items, five specific to assessing affective empathy
and five specific to assessing cognitive empathy, that were inspired
by related empathy questionnaires, and included terms related to
one of the six basic emotions. This was done for all six emotions,
thus resulting in subscales that differed only in the emotional con-
tent they addressed. Then, through a series of analyses, we can test
the convergent and discriminant validity of these scales.
The goal of this paper is to present a new empathymeasure that
assesses emotion specific affective and cognitive empathy. We will
present the psychometric properties of that measure, including
item and scale-level properties. Then, through a series of models,
we will test for discriminant validity between emotion specificity
in affective and cognitive empathy. Finally, we will compare our
measure with an existing empathy measure.
METHODS
SAMPLE
Participants were recruited through the online Mechanical Turk
survey website and were provided $8.00 for participating. Recent
studies suggest Mechanical Turk can be used to obtain data from
a demographically diverse sample with data that is comparable
to samples collected via traditional methods (Buhrmester et al.,
2011; Casler et al., 2013). In addition, research suggests that
Mechanical Turk participants are similar to student samples on
many personality characteristics, with the exception of extraver-
sion and self-esteem (Goodman et al., 2013). Because in online
testing participants are anonymous, one potential drawback of
this methodology is participants will not complete the measures
seriously. To control for this, we included two attention-check
questions (recommended for Mechanical Turk studies; Goodman
et al., 2013) and removed participants who showed no variance
in their responses suggesting the person consistently selected the
same response.
Initially, 616 individuals participated; we removed 127 partic-
ipants because they incorrectly responded to the attention-check
questions, and an additional three were removed because there
was no variance in their response across an entire scale. Our final
sample consisted of 486 participants (243 Women), primarily
White, non-Hispanic (76%; 7% Black, non-Hispanic; 8% Asian;
9% Other), from a range of education levels (13%High School or
GED equivalent, 33% Some College, 11% Associates Degree, 35%
Bachelors Degree, 8% More than a Bachelors Degree).
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The Emotion Specific Empathy questionnaire was administered
in a large online questionnaire study including other measures
not discussed in this paper that took roughly 50min to complete.
Emotion Specific Empathy (ESE)
The ESE consists of 60-items; five items per subscale (see Table 2
for items1 organized by subscale and instructions for reverse cod-
ing). Participants are asked to “Please indicate how strongly you
agree or disagree with the following statements. Use the scale
below and write your answers in the spaces provided.” The mea-
sure uses a 7-point likert scale: -3, Disagree Strongly; -2, Disagree
Somewhat; -1, Disagree Slightly; 0, Neutral; 1, Agree Slightly;
2, Agree Somewhat; 3, Agree Strongly. Scores for subscales are
computed by taking an average across all relevant items.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980)
The IRI is a 28-item measure with a 5-point likert scale that
assesses empathy through four subscales. In this study, we
present results related to two of those subscales: (1) Empathic
Concern, considered to measure affective empathy (α = 0.70);
and Perspective Taking, considered to measure cognitive empathy
(α = 0.88).
RESULTS
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
First, we evaluated the internal consistency of the ESE subscales.
According to Cronbach’s alpha (α, 1951), which estimates the
average inter-item correlation, and Omega Total (ω, McDonald,
1999), which estimates the extent to which scale variance is due
to a single general factor, each ESE subscale had adequate internal
consistency (see Table 1 for estimates).
The internal consistency of each subscale was also assessed by
modeling each subscale in Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
with Maximum Likelihood estimation and with each of the five
subscale items predicted by a single latent construct. We chose
to model the subscales individually, instead of modeling all 12
subscales in a single model, because a single model with all 60
items would have required us to estimate more parameters than
is suggested with our current sample size. A ratio of 5:1, or 5 par-
ticipants for every parameter, is considered to be the minimum
ratio for a CFA (Kline, 2005) so with 486 participants, we should
estimate nomore than 97 parameters, which is less than the mini-
mum of 120 parameters we would need for the 60 items, ignoring
any covariances between the latent factors. Also, our goal was to
identify model misfit for the individual subscales, which is harder
to identify when the subscales are combined into a single model.
The subscale measurement models were evaluated accord-
ing to the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic, absolute fit indices
1We have also developed a German version of the ESE, which is available in
the Supplementary Material.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 653 | 3
Olderbak et al. Emotion specific empathy
Table 1 | ESE Subscale Statistics.
Anger Anger Disgust Disgust Fear Fear Happy Happy Sad Sad Surprise Surprise
Affective Cognitive Affective Cognitive Affective Cognitive Affective Cognitive Affective Cognitive Affective Cognitive
α 0.87 0.75 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.74 0.89 0.85 0.90 0.81 0.89 0.78
ω 0.88 0.78 0.92 0.78 0.89 0.74 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.82 0.89 0.79
COMPARING MEANS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN
Men
Mean 4.11 5.36 3.96 5.09 3.93 5.17 5.16 5.74 4.46 5.53 3.97 5.16
SD 1.19 0.91 1.22 0.99 1.17 0.90 1.11 0.92 1.26 0.94 1.15 0.89
Women
Mean 4.43 5.48 4.51 5.27 4.63 5.40 5.68 6.00 5.17 5.83 4.41 5.30
SD 1.23 0.89 1.26 0.91 1.25 0.88 1.01 0.84 1.14 0.81 1.20 0.89
T -test [t(483)] 2.94* 1.52 4.87* 2.10* 6.36* 2.83* 5.35* 3.31* 6.52* 3.75* 4.20* 1.72
Cohen’s d 0.26 0.13 0.44 0.19 0.58 0.26 0.49 0.30 0.59 0.34 0.37 0.16
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Original structure
χ2 50.81* 9.67 44.39* 39.51* 38.93* 65.26* 5.77 49.35* 46.62* 48.64* 43.39* 104.96*
χ2 df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
SRMR 0.034 0.022 0.022 0.048 0.036 0.061 0.010 0.040 0.030 0.042 0.030 0.073
RMSEA 0.137 0.044 0.128 0.119 0.118 0.158 0.018 0.135 0.131 0.134 0.126 0.203
CFI 0.967 0.992 0.977 0.947 0.976 0.885 1.000 0.957 0.974 0.946 0.972 0.859
TLI 0.933 0.984 0.955 0.894 0.952 0.769 0.999 0.914 0.948 0.892 0.944 0.717
With added covariances
χ2 5.39 na 13.11* 10.15* 10.53* 10.54* na 8.68 9.66* 7.66 2.28 9.84*
χ2 df 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
SRMR 0.013 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.015 0.020 0.006 0.025
RMSEA 0.041 0.069 0.070 0.058 0.058 0.049 0.054 0.043 0.000 0.055
CFI 0.998 0.995 0.989 0.995 0.988 0.995 0.996 0.996 1.000 0.992
TLI 0.994 0.987 0.963 0.988 0.969 0.989 0.991 0.989 1.0032 0.979
*p < 0.05; na = not applicable.
[root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger
and Lind, 1980) and the standardized root mean squared
residual (SRMR; Bentler, 1995)], and incremental fit indices
[Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker and Lewis, 1973)]. Hu and Bentler
(1999) recommended these fit indices, among others, in eval-
uating model fit and in particular the combination of SRMR
with the RMSEA, CFI, and TLI. According to Hu and Bentler,
the following values indicate the model is a good fit to
the data: SRMR < 0.06, RMSEA < 0.06, CFI ≥ 0.95, and
TLI ≥ 0.95.
There was some disagreement between the fit indices: Only
two models showed poor fit to the data according to all of the fit
indices, however eight of the remaining 10 models showed poor
fit according to at least one fit index. Ten models were rejected
according to the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic and the RMSEA;
however, the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic is easily inflated by large
samples, leading to a high likelihood the model will be rejected
(Kline, 2005), and some suggest the RMSEA statistic is artifi-
cially inflated in models with low degrees of freedom (see Kenny
et al., 2014), which is also a characteristic of these models. Eight
2TLI can sometimes fall outside of the 0–1 range (Kline, 2005).
models showed poor fit to the data according to SRMR, CFI,
and/or TLI.
Next, we examined individually each of the 10 models that
showed poor fit to the data according to one or more fit index for
sources of model misfit; then, we compared these sources across
subscales to identify any potential patterns in subscales. Themod-
ification indices for each of these 10 models suggested model fit
could be improved with the addition of one to two covariances
between residuals. We chose to model additional covariances,
instead of removing items, in order to keep the item structure
within each subscale similar to the others to help with the later
evaluation of convergent and discriminant validity between the
subscales. The added covariances ultimately reflected weak to
moderate relations between items and, as will be discussed next,
indicated no consistent pattern across subscales (see Table 2 for
added covariances).
The recommended additional covariances between the resid-
uals of affective empathy subscale items were primarily between
three item types: (1) “I feel angry when I see that something
is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel angry.” (2)
“When I see that my friend is angry about something, I easily
feel angry as well.” and (3) “If a friend told me about an event
in his/her life that made him/her feel angry, I will easily feel angry
as well.” (where the emotional word, italicized in these examples,
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Table 2 | ESE items and CFA coefficients.
ESE subscales CFA β
ANGER AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(1) I am not easily infected by the anger of other people. (-) 0.484
(20) I feel angry when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel angry. 0.728
(22) When I see that my friend is angry about something, I easily feel angry as well. 0.767
(38) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel angry, I will easily feel angry as well. 0.821
(39) I easily feel angry when the people around me feel angry. 0.909
Added covariances: Items 20 and 22 r = 0.07, Items 22 and 38 r = 0.17
ANGER COGNITIVE EMPATHY
(18) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons angry. (-) 0.461
(25) I can easily think about events that will make my friends angry. 0.562
(31) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her angry, I can easily understand why that event made him/her angry. 0.754
(51) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends angry. (-) 0.676
(55) It is easy for me to understand why others become angry when something awful happens to them. 0.730
Added covariances: None
DISGUST AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(10) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel disgust, I will easily feel disgusted as well. 0.813
(23) When I see that my friend is disgusted about something, I easily feel disgust as well. 0.911
(24) I feel disgust when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel disgust. 0.889
(29) I am not easily infected by the disgust of other people. (-) 0.705
(59) I easily feel disgust when the people around me feel disgust. 0.844
Added covariances: Items 10 and 24 r = −0.10
DISGUST COGNITIVE EMPATHY
(5) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends disgusted. (-) 0.566
(8) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her feel disgusted, I can easily understand why that event made him/her
disgusted.
0.803
(14) I can easily think about events that will make my friends disgusted. 0.418
(37) It is easy for me to understand why others become disgusted when something awful happens to them. 0.792
(49) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons disgusted. (-) 0.580
Added covariances: Items 5 & 14 r = −0.12, Items 14 & 49 r = 0.15
FEAR AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(4) I feel scared when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel scared. 0.656
(6) I am not easily infected by the fear of other people. (-) 0.611
(33) I easily feel scared when the people around me feel scared. 0.856
(45) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel scared, I will easily feel scared as well. 0.856
(56) When I see that my friend is scared about something, I easily feel scared as well. 0.892
Added covariances: Items 4 and 6 r = 0.15
FEAR COGNITIVE EMPATHY
(3) It is easy for me to understand why others become scared when something frightening happens to them. 0.401
(11) I can easily think about events that will make my friends scared. 0.514
(26) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons scared. (-) 0.691
(30) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends scared. (-) 0.726
(60) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her scared, I can easily understand why that event made him/her scared. 0.567
Added covariances: Items 3 and 60 r = 0.28
HAPPY AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(28) I easily feel happy when the people around me feel happy. 0.855
(32) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel happy, I will easily feel happy as well. 0.854
(34) I feel happy when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel happy. 0.731
(35) When I see that my friend is happy about something, I automatically feel happy as well. 0.892
(42) I am not easily infected by the happiness of other people. (-) 0.681
Added covariances: None
HAPPY COGNITIVE EMPATHY
(13) It is easy for me to understand why others become happy when something pleasant happens to them. 0.793
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
ESE subscales CFA β
(17) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends happy. (-) 0.696
(41) I can easily think about events that will make my friends happy. 0.708
(46) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons happy. (-) 0.638
(47) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her happy, I can easily understand why that event made him/her happy. 0.803
Added covariances: Items 41 and 46 r = 0.19
SAD AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(2) I easily feel sad when the people around me feel sad. 0.862
(36) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel sad, I will easily feel sad as well. 0.825
(44) I feel sad when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel sad. 0.838
(48) When I see that my friend is sad about something, I easily feel sad as well. 0.820
(54) I am not easily infected by the sadness of other people. (-) 0.672
Added covariances: Items 44 and 48 r = 0.12
SAD COGNITIVE EMPATHY
(12) It is easy for me to understand why others become sad when something heartbreaking happens to them. 0.696
(15) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends sad. (-) 0.725
(43) I can easily think about events that will make my friends sad. 0.533
(52) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons sad. (-) 0.580
58) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her sad, I can easily understand why that event made him/her sad. 0.807
Added covariances: Items 43 and 52 r = 0.22
SURPRISE AFFECTIVE EMPATHY
(7) When I see that my friend is surprised about something, I easily feel surprise as well. 0.864
(9) I am not easily infected by the surprise of other people. (-) 0.738
(19) I easily feel surprise when the people around me feel surprise. 0.837
(40) If a friend told me about an event in his/her life that made him/her feel surprise, I will easily feel surprised as well. 0.757
(53) I feel surprise when I see that something is happening to a stranger that makes him/her feel surprise. 0.713
Added covariances: Items 40 and 53 r = 0.15
SURPRISE COGNITIVE EMPATHY
16) It is easy for me to understand why others become surprised when something unexpected happens to them. 0.440
(21) I have a hard time predicting what situations will make other persons surprised. (-) 0.664
(27) If someone tells me about an event that made him/her surprised, I can easily understand why that event made him/her surprised. 0.598
(50) It is difficult for me to understand what makes my friends surprised. (-) 0.730
(57) I can easily think about events that will make my friends surprised. 0.714
Added covariances: Items 16 and 27 r = 0.34
The numbers presented before each item indicate that item’s order of presentation in the questionnaire. (-) indicates the item should be reverse coded when scored.
changed depending on the emotion of interest). However, the
covariances only occurred in one or two subscales for the same
pair of items and were always weak in nature, suggesting there
was not a consistent pattern among the item types across the
affective empathy subscales. The recommended additional covari-
ances between the residuals of cognitive empathy subscale items
were not specific to any item. For three subscales (Disgust, Happy,
and Sad Cognitive Empathy), there was a weak positive relation
between “I can easily think about events that will makemy friends
disgusted” and “I have a hard time predicting what situations will
make other people disgusted.” The two strongest added covari-
ances were for the Fear and Surprise Cognitive Empathy subscales
between item types “It is easy for me to understand why others
become scaredwhen something frightening happens to them.” and
“If someone tells me about an event that made him/her scared,
I can easily understand why that event made him/her scared.”
Like with the affective subscale items, there was not a consistent
pattern across all cognitive empathy subscales suggesting there
was not a systemic problem in the structure of the affective or
cognitive empathy items. In the final CFAs, with the added covari-
ances, all items showed moderate to strong relations to the single
construct (see Tables 1, 2). Overall, these results suggest the ESE
subscales show sufficient internal consistency.
SUBSCALE STATISTICS
Next, we computed the mean values of the subscales. On all sub-
scales women self-reported higher scores compared with men,
which is consistent with other self-report empathy scales (e.g.,
Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006; Carré et al., 2013). These differences
were significant for all subscales, with the exception of Anger
Cognitive Empathy and Surprise Cognitive Empathy, however the
effect sizes, assessed with Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992), were all small
to medium (see Table 1).
The mean values of the subscales were correlated with each
other to test the convergent and discriminant validity between the
subscales (see Table 3; Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The items were
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Table 3 | ESE subscale correlations and covariances.
Affective subscales Cognitive subscales
Anger Disgust Fear Happy Sad Surprise Anger Disgust Fear Happy Sad Surprise
A
ffe
ct
iv
e Anger 1.49 1.10 1.03 0.58 1.04 0.94 0.39 0.36 0.28 0.15 0.25 0.23
Disgust 0.71* 1.60 1.19 0.69 1.05 1.16 0.38 0.61 0.44 0.27 0.38 0.40
Fear 0.67* 0.75* 1.59 0.62 1.09 1.11 0.25 0.37 0.42 0.21 0.31 0.30
Happy 0.43* 0.50* 0.45* 1.20 0.92 0.66 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.59 0.47 0.40
Sad 0.68* 0.66* 0.69* 0.67* 1.57 0.86 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.52 0.31
Surprise 0.64* 0.77* 0.74* 0.51* 0.57* 1.43 0.28 0.41 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.43
C
og
ni
tiv
e Anger 0.35* 0.34* 0.22* 0.38* 0.34* 0.26* 0.81 0.60 0.56 0.51 0.60 0.54
Disgust 0.31* 0.51* 0.31* 0.36* 0.35* 0.36* 0.70* 0.90 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.58
Fear 0.26* 0.39* 0.37* 0.42* 0.38* 0.36* 0.70* 0.70* 0.81 0.53 0.61 0.59
Happy 0.14* 0.24* 0.18* 0.60* 0.37* 0.23* 0.64* 0.61* 0.66* 0.79 0.63 0.53
Sad 0.23* 0.34* 0.28* 0.48* 0.47* 0.26* 0.75* 0.70* 0.77* 0.79* 0.79 0.55
Surprise 0.22* 0.36* 0.27* 0.41* 0.28* 0.41* 0.67* 0.69* 0.74* 0.68* 0.69* 0.79
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS OF ESE SUBSCALES WITH IRI EMPATHY SUBSCALES
Empathic concern 0.44* 0.48* 0.47* 0.64* 0.66* 0.42* 0.38* 0.38* 0.41* 0.43* 0.49* 0.36*
Perspective taking 0.15* 0.22* 0.20* 0.38* 0.31* 0.26* 0.30* 0.35* 0.36* 0.34* 0.38* 0.35*
*p < 0.05; In the top half of the table, correlations are presented below the diagonal, variances on the diagonal, and covariances above the diagonal. Correlation
coefficients in the top left quadrant indicate the convergent validity between the affective empathy subscales and correlation coefficients in the bottom right
quadrant indicate the convergent validity between the cognitive empathy subscales. Correlation coefficients in the bottom left quadrant indicate the discriminant
validity between the emotion specific affective and cognitive empathy subscales, with the exception of the those coefficients presented in boldface, which indicate
the convergent validity between the emotion specific subscales (i.e., Anger Affective Empathy with Anger Cognitive Empathy). The bottom half of the table presents
correlations between the ESE and IRI subscales.
derived from the same stem by instantiating emotion specific con-
tent so any reduction in the correlation from 1.0 would indicate
a discrimination between the subscales that could be attributable
to the emotion content differences. The correlations between the
ESE affective subscales range from moderately to strongly related
(r’s range from 0.43 to 0.77; average r = 0.63; Cohen, 1992),
with the average shared variance amongst the scales at 40%, sug-
gesting that while the subscales are similar to one another they
are not perfectly related and are instead distinct. Correlations
between the cognitive subscales were stronger compared with the
strength of the relations between the affective subscales (r’s range
from 0.64 to 0.79; average r = 0.70; average R2 = 0.49); likewise,
the strength of these correlations and the average shared vari-
ance suggest the emotion specific cognitive empathy subscales
are also distinct. Finally, correlations between the emotion con-
gruent subscales ranged from moderate to strongly related (r’s
range from 0.35 to 0.60; average r = 0.45; average R2 = 0.20)
suggesting that while distinct, there is convergence (indicated
by moderate to strong relations between the subscales and an
average shared variance above null) between the emotion congru-
ent empathy subscales. These correlations were in general larger
than the correlations between the affective and cognitive empa-
thy subscales that were emotion incongruent (r’s range from
0.14 to 0.48; average r = 0.31; average R2 = 0.10) suggesting dis-
criminant validity between the affective and cognitive empathy
subscales and between emotions.
Finally, the ESE subscales were correlated with Empathic
Concern and Perspective Taking, from the IRI. When correlated
with Empathic Concern, all of the ESE affective subscales show
stronger relations compared with their ESE cognitive empathy
counterpart. And, when correlated with Perspective Taking, all
of the ESE cognitive empathy subscales, with the exception of
happy show stronger relations compared with their ESE affective
empathy counterpart.
ESE MEASUREMENT MODEL
Because there is a lot of overlap between the subscales in terms
of what they measure (i.e., affective subscales measure affective
empathy, however each affective subscale should also measure
an emotion specific empathy and thus is conceptually related to
its emotion-specific cognitive empathy counterpart), we tested
a series of hypothesized measurement model structures for the
ESE measure, with the 12 subscales as indicators, that apply con-
straints to test specific hypotheses about the structure of the
ESE measure and the differentiation between emotion specific
empathies. Because we hypothesized emotion specific differen-
tiation in empathy, the presented models focus on an emotion
specific differentiation structure to the ESE measure. Each model
tests specific hypotheses regarding the convergent and discrim-
inate validity of the emotion specific empathies, ranging from
complete discrimination between constructs to complete conver-
gence. These models apply various constraints in a Multitrait-
Multimethod framework (MTMM; Widaman, 1985; see Figure 1
for hypothesized models). Because of known convergence prob-
lems with the final solution of correlated trait andmethod factors,
this structure was not modeled (Kenny and Kashy, 1992).
Regarding the modeling of method variance, we opted for the
inclusion of two methods factors (i.e., an affective empathy latent
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FIGURE 1 | Hypothesized Measurement Model Structures based on the MTMM framework.
variable and a cognitive empathy latent variable) instead of the
correlated uniqueness model (Marsh, 1989) or the correlated-
trait correlated-method-1 structure (CTCM-1; Eid et al., 2008)
in order to identify latent constructs for each empathy construct
measured by ESE, so that later these latent constructs are available
for testing covariate relations. In addition, the correlated unique-
ness model is known to have bias when there are strong loadings
on methods factors and strong correlations between method
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factors, which is a characteristic of our data (see Figure 2 below
for loadings on method factors; Conway et al., 2004). Because the
emotion factors are indicated by only two manifest variables, we
added an additional constraint to adequately identify the emo-
tion latent variable by constraining the unstandardized loadings
from both manifest variables to equality forcing the affective and
cognitive emotion subscale to load equally on the correspond-
ing emotion latent factor 3. Through an evaluation of model fit
indices we can identify the best fitting structure to the data
(see Table 4).
First, wemodeled a single general empathy factor for all 12 ESE
subscales (Model 1), suggesting a single type of empathy wasmea-
sured by all subscales; however, this model showed poor fit to the
data. Next, we modeled emotion specific latent variables, which
were either constrained to be orthogonal (Model 2) or allowed
to covary (Model 3); both showed poor fit (with Model 3 pro-
ducing an improper solution, most likely because the emotion
factors are indicated by only two variables each, something that
Gerbing and Anderson, 1985, 1987 found often results in models
with improper solutions) suggesting modeling only differentia-
tion between emotion specific empathies cannot account for the
data.
The last three models (Models 4–6) included an affec-
tive and cognitive latent variable, indicated by the six affec-
tive or cognitive empathy scales, that were constrained to be
either orthogonal to one another or covary. Of these three
models, Model 6 showed acceptable fit, with the exception
of the RMSEA statistic (which will be discussed next), and
showed the best fit compared to the other five models, so
3Models 1–6 were also modeled with the unstandardized loadings on each
emotion specific empathy model constrained so that they summed to one (cf.
Little et al., 2007). However, model fit was always worse than the fit presented
in Table 4, or resulted in models with improper solutions with the predicted
covariance matrices not positive definite, so these results were not presented.
this model was selected as our final measurement model4 (see
Figure 2).
The RMSEA statistic for Model 6 was above the recommended
value of 0.06made byHu and Bentler (1999); however, the value is
also considered mediocre fit byMacCallum et al. (1996) and good
fit by Steiger (1989). RMSEA can be easily inflated when a model
has the correct number of specified factors but has incorrectly
omitted a single covariance between residuals (Savalei, 2012). An
examination of themodification indices suggests that the addition
of a covariance between the residuals of Happy Affective Empathy
and Sad Affective Empathy, which is weak in size (r = 0.12, p <
0.05), results in a lower RMSEA statistic [χ2(32) = 97.50, p < 0.05,
SRMR = 0.044, RMESA = 0.065(0.051−0.080), CFI = 0.987, TLI =
0.973]. However, we refrain from including this covariance in
our final measurement model because we did not specify this
covariance a priori (Steiger, 1990), the additional covariance will
most likely not replicate in future samples (MacCallum et al.,
1992), and omitting this covariance will most likely not impact
the basic correlational pattern between latent factors (Newcomb
and Bentler, 1988).
Model 6 identified orthogonal affective and cognitive fac-
tors, which suggest the ESE measure has adequate differentiation
between the affective and cognitive subscales, and emotion spe-
cific latent factors, suggesting there is emotion specific empathy
for the six basic emotions. The emotion latent variables were
allowed to correlate with one another, showing strong corre-
lations with one another, suggesting that individuals who self-
report high scores on one emotion empathy will also report high
4To test that the model fit is not attributable to the orthogonal affective
and cognitive empathy latent variables, we estimated a seventh model that
included no emotion specific latent factors but instead only an affective empa-
thy and a cognitive empathy latent factor that were orthogonal to one another.
That model showed poor fit to the data, χ2(54) = 953.31, p < 0.05, SRMR =
238, RMESA = 0.185(0.175–0.196), CFI = 0.819, TLI = 0.779.
FIGURE 2 | Final ESE Measurement Model (Model 6).
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Table 4 | Measurement model fit.
Model Model fit
(1) One general empathy factor χ2(54) = 2182.85, p < 0.05, SRMR = 189, RMESA = 0.285(0.275−0.295),
CFI = 0.571, TLI = 0.476
(2) Orthogonal emotion factors χ2(60) = 4323.95, p < 0.05, SRMR = 0.461, RMESA = 0.383(0.373−0.393),
CFI = 0.141, TLI = 0.055
(3) Covarying emotion factors Improper solution (predicted covariance matrix is not positive definite)
(4) Orthogonal emotion factors and orthogonal affective and cognitive
factors
χ2(48) = 430.79, p < 0.05, SRMR = 0.221, RMESA = 0.128(0.117−0.140),
CFI = 0.923, TLI = 0.894
(5) Orthogonal emotion factors and covarying affective and cognitive
factors
χ2(47) = 337.47, p < 0.05, SRMR = 0.073, RMESA = 0.113(0.102−0.124),
CFI = 0.942, TLI = 0.918
(6) Covarying emotion factors and orthogonal affective and cognitive
factors
χ2(33) = 147.24, p < 0.05, SRMR = 0.048, RMESA = 0.085(0.071−0.099),
CFI = 0.977, TLI = 0.954
scores on the other empathies. This model also supports our
earlier hypothesis of emotion specific differentiation in empathy.
ESE AND THE IRI
Next, we compared the ESE with the Empathic Concern and
Perspective Taking subscales of the IRI. The mean score for both
IRI subscales were included as manifest variables and were cor-
related with the respective affective or cognitive latent variable as
well of each of the emotion specific latent variables (see Table 5
for correlation coefficients)5. Empathic Concern was moderately
related with Affective Empathy and Perspective Taking was mod-
erately related with Cognitive Empathy respectively. Empathic
Concern showed stronger relations with the emotion specific
latent variables, compared with Perspective Taking, and interest-
ingly, both Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking showed
the strongest relation with Sad Empathy. These results support
our earlier suggestion that the IRI seems to include a focus on
sadness.
DISCUSSION
SUMMARY
We developed and tested a questionnaire that assesses individual
differences in self-reported emotion specific empathy behavior.
The purpose of this paper was to identify if there is any emo-
tion specific bias in empathic reactions. To test that research
question, we designed a measure that presented six equivalent
cognitive empathy subscales and six equivalent affective empa-
thy subscales that differ only in the emotional term used. Our
results suggest that while the affective empathy subscales are
strongly correlated with one another, as well as the cognitive
empathy subscales with each other, these correlations are far from
unity, with the average shared variance between the subscales
5We chose to model a correlation between the Affective Empathy latent vari-
able with Empathic Concern, and a correlation between Cognitive Empathy
latent variable with Perspective Taking because those relations were theoret-
ically specified, and we did not model a correlation between the Affective
Empathy latent variable with Perspective Taking or Cognitive Empathy latent
variable with Empathic Concern because those relations were not hypoth-
esized beforehand. When modeled, it is apparent that the ESE Affective
Empathy is not similar to Perspective Taking (r = −0.03) nor is the ESE
Cognitive Empathy latent variable related to Empathic Concern (r = −0.57).
Table 5 | Correlation coefficients between the IRI subscales and the
ESE latent variables.
ESE latent variable Empathic concern Perspective taking
Affective empathy 0.29* –
Cognitive empathy – 0.31*
Anger empathy 0.49* 0.22*
Disgust empathy 0.40* 0.26*
Fear empathy 0.52* 0.30*
Happy empathy 0.58* 0.30*
Sad empathy 0.69* 0.35*
Surprise empathy 0.45* 0.31*
*p < 0.05.
at 40% (affective empathy subscales) and 49% (cognitive empa-
thy subscales). These results suggest that there is some emotion
specificity in empathy, which of course may not be limited to
these six emotions. Based on these results we suggest that the
empathy construct is broader than is currently measured and
that emotion specificity is something empathy researchers should
consider.
The proposed newmeasure of emotion specific empathy shows
adequate internal consistency (as is indicated by Cronbach’s
alpha, Omega, and the CFAs) and appropriate relations with
external constructs (as is indicated by the correlations in Table 3).
Based on the bivariate correlations, the ESE subscales are related
yet distinct from one another, supporting our hypothesis that
empathy is emotion specific and can be measured as such. The
reported results also suggest that we can identify emotion spe-
cific empathy at both the level of general empathy, as evidenced
by the emotion specific latent constructs modeled in the CFA,
and the level of affective and cognitive empathy, as indicated
by the correlations between the ESE subscales. When modeled
in a measurement model, we see differentiation between the
emotion specific empathies. Finally, we see that the IRI sub-
scales, when correlated with the ESE affective, cognitive, and the
emotion specific empathies, show the strongest relations with
sadness empathy. These results suggest that these IRI subscales
are selective in that they are particularly focused on sadness
empathy.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The ESE measure is structured based on the six basic emotions
(anger, disgust, fear, happy, sad, and surprise). This is just one
framework through which to address emotion, however given the
emotion bias we found, we suggest that future research should test
other proposed emotion structures, such as examining positive
and negative affect. While the ESE measure includes more nega-
tive affect subscales than positive, we attempted to test this struc-
ture with the current data. We remodeled the data and removed
the emotion specific latent variables and instead modeled only
two latent variables, one for negative empathy (indicated by the
ESE items for anger, disgust, fear, and sad empathy) and one for
positive empathy (indicated by the ESE items for happy empathy).
Because we modeled these structures at the item level, the models
were specific to only affective or only cognitive empathy, because
otherwise with 50manifest variables (i.e., 5 items per affective and
cognitive empathy subscale), that model would have required us
to estimate more parameters than is suggested with our current
sample size. Modeling the data in this way presumes that there is
only a positive and negative specific empathy, and that the emo-
tion categories are not a proper structure to the data. However,
model fit for both affective and cognitive empathy was poor 6 sug-
gesting that this structure did not fit the data. The measure, how-
ever, contains more items assessing emotions considered to have
a negative valence, compared with the items considered to have a
positive valence, which leads to perhaps a better identification of
negative affect than the data allows for positive affect. A proper
balance of positive and negative emotions would allow us a
better dataset to properly test for higher-order positive and neg-
ative affective and/or cognitive empathy factors. This is fruitful
direction for future research, however it was not addressed here.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The measure presented in this article, for the first time, differen-
tiates cognitive and affective empathic responses for the six basic
emotions (Frijda, 1986). In our view, the identification of an emo-
tion specific bias in empathy represents an important new contri-
bution to the conceptualization and measurement of empathy. As
mentioned in the beginning, theoretical models of empathy imply
in their assumptions that empathic responses should depend on
the type of emotion that is empathized (cf. Preston and de Waal,
2002). In addition, research suggests empathy related concepts,
including facial mimicry and recognition of emotions in the face,
are emotion specific in their relations to each other (cf. Oberman
et al., 2007; Ponari et al., 2012). Hence, assessing empathy in an
emotion specific manner represents the consequential next step
when studying empathy. As a result, we presented a new measure
that differentiates empathic traits depending on emotion.
Measuring empathy emotion specifically may help solve
observed empirical inconsistencies regarding empathy and empa-
thy related constructs. For example, whereas some researchers
document a relation between empathy and facial mimicry (cf.
6Model fit for affective empathy was χ2(274) = 2507.88, p < 0.05, SRMR =
077, RMESA = 0.130(0.125−0.134), CFI = 0.775, TLI = 0.753, and for cog-
nitive empathy the model fit was χ2(274) = 2088.78, p < 0.05, SRMR = 085,
RMESA = 0.117(0.112−0.122), CFI = 0.739, TLI = 0.714.
Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003) others find no relation (e.g.,
Rives Bogart and Matsumoto, 2010). Possibly, these inconsisten-
cies result from a too undifferentiated measurement of empathy.
If emotion specific empathic responses exist, and this is what
our data suggest, then there should be differences between indi-
viduals in their emotion specific empathy; for example, some
being more anger- than sadness-empathic while others are more
sadness- or happiness-empathic. Likewise, and as elaborated in
the introduction, it is also plausible to assume that different types
of emotion specific empathy relate to different levels ofmimicking
specific emotions. Highly sadness-empathic individuals might be
“good” sadness mimickers butmight not show enhancedmimicry
regarding anger or happiness. In addition, it is likewise plausi-
ble to expect empathy related behavioral outcomes (e.g., helping
behavior) to be moderated by emotion specificity. Whereas sad-
ness empathy should be related to increased helping behavior
(in fact, this is documented given that so far empathy has been
conceptualized as an empathic response to other’s sadness, cf.
Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Davis, 1983; Batson et al., 1989,
1997), this is not necessarily the case for anger or disgust empathy.
As elaborated above, anger arises when individuals are con-
fronted with sudden obstacles in the pursuit of their goal, lead-
ing to an urge to go against this obstacle (Haidt, 2003). More
importantly, anger is associated with perceiving oneself possess-
ing sufficient resources (i.e., coping potential) to deal with the
impediment (e.g., to lash out; Roseman et al., 1994). Hence, relat-
ing with someone’s anger should also be informative about the
observer indicating the observer perceives him- or herself capable
to deal with the situation (as this appraisal is essential for anger
to be experienced; cf. Frijda, 1986). This in turn suggests that
helping behavior as a consequence of anger empathy is not par-
ticularly likely to emerge and instead suggests the observer may
actually react with aggressive behavior in an anger-empathic state.
In lieu of the possibility that the behavioral consequences
of empathy differ depending on the empathized emotion, our
understanding and conceptualization of empathy becomes more
differentiated. So far, literature on empathy and its consequences
suggests empathy is the competence for beneficial social inter-
action and communication; we referred to these benefits at the
start of this paper (cf. Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Batson et al.,
1989, 1991, 1997; Dovidio et al., 2010). However, it might be
worthwhile to consider the possibly detrimental consequences of
empathy when conceptualized emotion specifically. As illustrated
above, anger empathy might have different behavioral implica-
tions than sadness empathy. While fostering sadness empathy
probably yields positive outcomes for social interactions, this
might not be the case for anger empathy. These implications
should be considered when implementing empathy-based train-
ings, for example, to reduce stereotypes or racial biases (cf. Batson
et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2010).
Considering empathy as emotion specific opens up numerous
new lines of research. Given the potential differences in behav-
ioral reactions that differ as a result of felt emotion, next steps
in research should test for behavioral correlates associated with
emotion specific empathy; for example, testing differences in
helping behavior or stereotype bias as they relates to emotion spe-
cific empathy. In addition, future research could use experimental
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studies for further validation of the emotion specificity of this
construct; for example, testing for emotion specific differences in
empathy related constructs such as facial mimicry.
Finally, we believe that the notion of emotion specific empathy
also bears some applied value for empathy interventions that have
become popular in a variety of work or clinical contexts (cf. Day
et al., 2010). Empathy trainings should be designed according to
a person’s empathic traits, not on an overall level but rather in
a differentiated manner, considering that feeling with someone
experiencing something sad and being able to understand what
thoughts are related to this experience does not necessary apply
to the situation in which that person feels anger.
Taken together, given the prominent role of empathy in
successful social communication and interaction, the present
approach contributes to a better understanding of the concept of
empathy itself but also of individual differences in this trait.
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